Lustrum: Defending our values? With Minister of Defence Ollongren

Wow. Well. Yes, it's a year ago I left office, more or less. And we, at the time, things were also heated and difficult with the war in Ukraine, with the situation in the Middle East and Israel and Gaza. So it was certainly not, I mean, it was not easy. And in NATO, we knew we had to step up our efforts, increase our budgets, improve our cooperation, invest in defense tech industry, in defense industry in general, scale up production, all that. And a year later, you could say that things have really only gotten worse. And that is because the war in Ukraine is still raging. We know that Russia has ramped up its defense industry production. It produces immense numbers of ammunition. It has no problem in recruiting for their military. And Ukraine is, you know, is under very, very much pressure right now. And at the same time, and this is what I worry about, there are so many other things going on in the world. And today, of course, we worry about the Middle East and Iran, that well, countries perhaps focus less on the support for Ukraine. And this especially, of course, because of the new position under the Trump administration of the United States, which seems to want to leave Ukraine to Europe and to itself. And that's what I worry most about, because I'm really convinced that Russia will not be content with only Ukraine. So they will go on in Ukraine, and they will try to take as much territory as they possibly can. But they will also continue their efforts in Georgia and in Moldova. And in the end, I believe they're actually, you know, building up to not only threaten NATO, but at some point, also actually attack NATO. And this is something that we should think about a lot these two days, when countries will agree, I believe, on the 5%.

Well, the core purpose is what it's always been. And that is, you know, this is an alliance where we stand together shoulder by shoulder and where we have the Article 5. That means that an attack on one is an attack on all, and that means that all will stand up and defend. And I think the strength of NATO has also always been its ability to deter. And it is a strong alliance, and I do believe it's true when you say it's the world's strongest alliance today, but also ever in history. So that's what it's all about. But at the same time, when there is doubt within the alliance, whether or not, the strongest ally, which is simply by, you know, sheer size, the United States, will actually engage or not, it's always been, it's there for the protection of Europe. That's what NATO is about. It was created after the Second World War, and it was created also because of the threat at that time from the Soviet Union. And that has really not changed. If you look today, the threat comes from Russia, the threat comes from the East, and the threat will affect Europe. And always in history, First World War, Second World War, the United States have been necessary to secure Europe. And I believe that does not change. Europe consists of many countries, none of them have the size to be able to lead that kind of effort.

Well, maybe the threat, I think, in the Cold War and also after the Cold War, there was this sort of bipolarity that we dealt with, and now we're dealing with a multi-polar world and also multi-polar threats. There is this, you know, you can call it the axis of evil, just to make clear what it is. And there is this sort of coordination among those countries, where I would definitely include Iran and North Korea, who is the main supplier of ammunition and other weapons and even military troops to Russia. And China plays a very dominant role. The position of China has also much changed, you know. Back in the, let's say, the 70s, China was really the younger, smaller brother of the Soviet Union. And now that's completely turned around. China is a very dominant, very strong, also military strong country. Russia is very dependent on China, and not only Russia is dependent on China, we're all dependent on China, because of their almost monopoly in the area of the rare earth minerals and their production capacity of certain technical things. So in this chain that we need to build things, the chain that we need in our industrial production, China plays a crucial role. So things are very different today than they were.

Well, China is, I mean, China is difficult to grasp. What are they really? But they have a very, you know, eternal friendship with Russia, which makes them part of, what I would say, the other side. At the same time, economically, in the global economy, they play an extremely important role. And that is why we in Europe also have started to think about de-risking from China. We cannot completely decouple from a country that is so dominant in the world economy. But at the same time, decisions in Beijing seem to be more predictable than those in Washington. To paraphrase the French foreign minister, you can't leave European security in the hands of a couple thousand voters in Wisconsin. But how does that shape the calculus in Brussels or in The Hague or other European capitals?

Well, I think, you know, in Europe, we need, first of all, we need to stay united within NATO and also within the European Union and European Union with the allied, sorry, with the partner countries that are not in the Union but are geographically in Europe. So Europe as a region, we need to coordinate our efforts. And we need to engage with all parts of the world and also all countries in the world. And there you have to be smart about this. So it would serve, would not serve our interests not to have a dialogue with China. I think it's very important that we do have one. But also we should not be naive about China. I was the minister of defense and before that for the interior, I was responsible for our intelligence services, the two we have in the Netherlands. And they will also tell the people in the Netherlands, don't be naive about China.

Well, that's a good question. Who can we blame for that? Where are you pointing the fingers? Yeah. Well, I mean, I think first, always look at yourself. I think that's probably the best. And it is definitely true that many European allies in NATO did not increase their defense spending fast enough. So the Wales Pledge was 11 years ago now. And it gave some room, of course, to reach the 2%, but also in my own country, we increased it only slightly. And not until the government that I was in as the minister of defense did we take the big step. And not until the large-scale invasion of Ukraine did we actually reach the 2%. And there, still, I had to fight for it politically. So if you look at yourself, I think we didn't take defense and deterrence serious enough, thinking that we had left all that behind us. And in the Second World War, we have NATO, we have the European Union, which was also created as a peace product, especially to avoid confrontations between European countries. And that's worked very well. But I think we were sort of not serious enough about seeing what Russia was doing, what Putin was preparing for. And at the same time, also in the Indo-Pacific, where China has built a huge military power, where they have surpassed us in some domains in technology. Greece is an area where I think certainly Europe hasn't done enough. The U.S. is still, of course, very strong. So in many ways, we have focused more on the issues of welfare, things like the things we feel are important in Europe, and they are. But you cannot do all of that without security. And history learns that there is, in general, there are more times of tensions and wars than peacetime. So these decades of relative quiet and peace are probably more the exception. And I think we have to get used to that. And I think the people have to get used to that. We've also lost our sense of, you know, that we have to be resilient as a society.

Well, because if you want to secure Europe, you need deterrence and defense. We have an organization that is equipped to do that, and it's called NATO. And most European countries are now in NATO, especially now that Sweden and Finland have joined. You cover Europe with NATO. So it doesn't make sense to me to think about creating something new when you already have in place what you need. And the problem is not that you don't have the organization and that you have the plans and the preparedness. The problem is that the biggest ally in NATO is unpredictable. And so that means that you have to look at how you can solve this issue. Now, Trump has said that he wants the other NATO allies to step up, to pay more, to do their part in NATO. And I mean, I disagree with almost everything that Trump says, but here he's probably right. So just looking at that, I would say let's keep NATO, let's keep the United States in, but let's increase the responsibility of the other 31 allies, mostly European, well, Canada I will just count in as a European country, and thereby allowing the United States to rebalance their resources. That means that they can eventually pull out some of their troops because we will take over the positions. It means that when we have invested in certain capabilities that we simply don't have as European countries, for instance, heavy lifting as a very clear example, but it's much more than that. We have to invest in those capabilities so that the Americans can take away their capabilities and put them to use elsewhere. And that is the rebalancing that this report talks about. We can do it, but we just need to plan it.

Yeah. Well, I think that was the way it was, but in the current situation with the large-scale war in Ukraine and the world where it is, we don't have the luxury for those kind of petty fights between institutions, and I think it's very good because the European Union and NATO, they are really engaging as partners and trying to see where European Union can strengthen NATO, and I think also Ursula von der Leyen, the new commissioner, Kobelius, they have spoken out that this is the purpose they have. So how to use the European Union to strengthen European defense by using the European Union's possibilities and instruments, which they can be financial, to give financial incentives for cooperation, for joint procurement, for joint capability development, so not doing what NATO does, but doing what Europe is good at, deregulation, make sure that the industry gets what it needs to ramp up. We have so many things that work very well in the European Union that makes us a global player in the economy, but for the defense industry, we're still completely fragmented into national industries, so there the European Union can really help. And the other examples that you gave, so the JEF, the Joint Expeditionary Force, I think is a very strong group of countries that are in principle like-minded, geographically connected, the north of Europe from the Baltics to the UK and the Netherlands, and able to act sometimes quicker than NATO can. And I think that's very important. It doesn't take much of our resources, and it's an effective way to show engagement and presence as we did at some point in the Baltic Sea.

It's fewer players, so you can act more quickly. And also there, you have prepared for certain scenarios. The ministers meet regularly, the charts meet regularly, and you can focus on much fewer areas than NATO would. And I also very much believe in those coalitions of neighboring countries, for instance. I know that Sweden and Finland are doing many things together, like we are doing many things with Germany, like we have integrated our navies with Belgium, that we're doing the QRA, the protection of our sky, with the Benelux together. It doesn't make any sense to do it on your own. So I think these are examples, and we would need much more of that in NATO.

Well, you know, in the end, the percentage is a way to free the budget to invest in capabilities and of course in people. And what really matters is not the amount or the percentage, but how you spend it to fill the capability targets. Now Spain says we can fill our capability targets with only 2.1, I think. Well, most countries would disagree with that. They think it's not possible. But it is true that if you spend your money wisely, if you do, for instance, more joint procurement, you will get more value for your money. And I think that should also be an incentive. So I understand this, you know, sort of agree to disagree. So Spain will agree to the 5% that is in the statement, but they only state that they will do it for less. Well, let's take up the challenge. If they can, fine. If they can't, they still have to spend more. And let's also not forget, it's not 5%, it's 3.5% for defense. And the rest is defense-related, but these are investments that we have to do anyway. You know, we have to improve the military mobility, so we have to invest in infrastructure. We have to invest in cyber defense, in border controls, in space and things like that. So countries are going to use this 1.5% by declaring expenses that were already in their books to be defense-related, and it's true. So I think what we're really looking at is 3.5%, which is a huge step for many countries, also for the Netherlands. And I think I really hope that they will not, you know, be happy about having the 3.5% in their books, but they will try to find ways to really tackle the fragmentation, to promote interoperability and interchangeability, to build this European defense industry and really invest in the newest technology, and not from a national perspective, from a NATO perspective, from a European perspective. So this summit and this 5%, it's only one step, but what it really is about is after this summit, the implementation and the execution of the things that are only now on paper.

Well, that's a good question. You could ask the Dutch government, but they would say, well, we are a caretaker government, we will have elections, and we will leave that to the next government. But if you were in government right now? Yeah, but some countries have actually planned for this. So the Swedes, for instance, just this week, they agreed on the 5% and on the funding of the 5%. And I think that is fantastic, and that's really the way it should be. And they also had the agreement of all parties in their parliament. So this, I think, is really an example of how you would like all countries to behave and to solve this issue, not pushing it forward to elections or new governments, but really, and probably, it depends on your country, it depends on your budgetary situation. I understand it's more difficult for Spain or France or Belgium, because their budgets are not balanced the way they are. In the Netherlands, I think we could afford to do a combination of some lending, some cuts in other budgets, and even, if there was political will, also some tax increases. So I don't think it's necessarily a problem for the Netherlands. It's a matter of political will.

Yeah, well, I think also there you have to be very honest also with society. Where could we do these cuts? I mean, but we start off our electoral campaign by all parties saying, well, yes, okay, we're in favor of defense spending, but we cannot cut on any of our expenditures. Well, and if that is your opening in the negotiations, it's going to be very difficult, because it's very normal to do budget cuts. And you can always, you know, you ask a group of people to propose cuts in all areas, so that you have all the facts on the table, and then you have to make political choices. So that's the way it's always worked in the past, and I think it would be a good idea to do it again.

Well, I can say, but that's also a statement, perhaps I'm not a politician anymore, but I would not be in favor of cutting on higher education, because I think that's not smart to do, because you will pay for it later on if you don't do that. So you would have to look all over the board. In our societies, we have very expensive pension systems, we have very expensive welfare systems, we have health care that's also very expensive, and it's not balanced anymore. So you have to find smart ways to make all of that sustainable, to make it less expensive for the taxpayer, and also to be able to pay for defense, because if you don't do that, if you don't have your defense and your security, then what is our society worth? I mean, at some point, if we actually would have to fight this war, because the Russians will continue to build up their defense, they will at some point attack NATO somewhere, then we are part of that defense, and then we actually have to invest much more than if we would now be wise and do the 3.5%.

I think, first of all, that you need to be very honest with your public about the world we're living in and the threats that we're facing. It's not something given by nature that we have peace in Europe. It's not. We shouldn't take it for granted. But if we want to keep it, then we have to prioritize it. And I understand, and I think there are some people who are being questioned about what are their main concerns. And I read this morning in the paper that defense is number five. Well, that's still the top five. That's much more than a couple of years ago. So after housing, health care, education, and I think also migration, there comes defense. And that's really a good start, I would say. And also, you know, you need people. You need more people to engage. You need more people to be willing to wear the uniform. And that means that they will not be available for health care, education, and our industries. So that's also, you have to be very smart about how you use new technologies and all the other areas, because we have a shortage of people in our workforce. So there are really many things to be dealt with. And I think also, and that's something that we don't talk so much about at NATO, but it's also about the competitiveness. It's also about Europe getting stronger, more competitive, having more economic growth. And if the economy grows more, of course, we would also have to increase our defense spending because of the percentage, but it would also help because countries will have more funding available for the things they need to do.

In their own region, but also...

And I think you're absolutely right in saying that it's not only about the budget and defense spending. It's even not only about defense. That's why I just added the economy and competitiveness, but it's also about diplomacy. It's also about trading with other parts of the world. It's also about engaging with other parts of the world. And it's, of course, unfortunate that with all this focus on wars that are raging in the world, we seem to be forgetting about how to prevent conflicts in the first place. And that requires engagement. And that requires that you are present in those countries with your embassies and with your industries, your companies and enterprises. And it's as important, I think, as building your defense.

Well, I just came back from Ukraine. I was there last week. I spoke to many of the Ukrainian leadership, but also the people living in Kiev. I was in Kiev. And it's really tough for them now. They've been dragging on for a very long time. They're under attack, literally. I happened to be there between two of these large-scale drone attacks of Kiev. And it's very difficult for them. And they keep stressing, you know, we need to have more air defense, we need to have more budget for our own defense industries. And we can do all of that. And I see European leaders struggling with this because of the need to increase defense spending, because of the need for all the other things that they want to do. And Ukraine doesn't seem to be top of mind anymore. And even the summits, President Zelensky will be here. He will address the Dutch parliament. They will come. But it's not going to be like the previous three NATO summits where Ukraine was really the most important topic. And I think that European leaders need to talk more about this. They need to explain that the war in Ukraine is existential not only to Ukraine. So we have invested a lot in Ukraine to enable them to defend themselves. They do so for Europe. They do so because they want to be part of this European family where people have the freedom to choose their own path in life. And that is what I mean when I talk about our values that we share with Ukraine. And the alternative is that bit by bit Ukraine will lose out and Russia will be able to keep those territories or even more, and that in the end Ukraine might not be able to exist anymore as an independent and sovereign country. And that would be really, really bad news for Europe because it will make Russia stronger and it will show that might does make right and that you can't just invade your neighbor and get away with it. And that will lead to a very, very insecure world where we are not sure about our future anymore. And I think we really have to take that very serious and we have to keep talking about this. I hope in our own election campaign here in the Netherlands it will also be about this, about the possibility of at some point a war where we have to fight, not only provide budget and weapons to another country.

The Balkans, Moldova is another example, Georgia already sort of crossed to the other side. Well, I think many of these countries, especially in the Balkans and that part of Europe, they are connected to the European Union and we have this dialogue and this perspective of membership and I think that is extremely important. And when you're in the inside of the European Union, you tend to forget that when you're in. So then you look at all you think that Brussels is a bureaucracy and expensive and things like that. But the countries outside the European Union, they really need to know that at some point they will be able to join the European Union. So I think that is one thing. The second is, of course, it's not only outside the European Union that we have these issues like with Serbia. We also have them inside the European Union. We also have them with Hungary, who is very difficult in support for Ukraine, who are blocking sanctions when it comes to Russia. And if it's one country, we manage it with the rest of the European Union. But increasingly, we are uncertain about the outcome of elections and worried that more countries will go on the same path as Hungary and that in the end, the European Union, as we want it to function, doesn't function anymore because then these types of decisions will be blocked. So also we have to look inside the European Union. Can we change that? Can we take away vetoes from countries that block all the others in things that you really want to do? So I think these are two things that we have to look at. And I agree also that there is Russian interference. We have to understand the working of social media and how easy it is for others to influence people. And that's also something we talked about what has changed. Well, this is also something that has changed immensely. You don't actually have to go and bribe people with money, which is also done in Moldova, for instance, but you can also just simply engage in adapting the algorithms and influence the electorate.

Yeah, it probably is, but I mean, it's not easy. You cannot regulate everything. This is always the debate also we have. What's the difference between free speech and interference? So it's always a balance, but I agree, and I think that's very dangerous, and it's obvious that Bosnia and Herzegovina is sort of the weak link here, the weak partner in this and easy to influence. And I think you can find some encouragement, for instance, in Moldova, but then there will be new elections again in that country, and then it could flip to the other side. So we have to be very, very vigilant and aware about this.

Well, I'm not sure we no longer have it, actually. I think we still – I mean, we're all here. I'm not sure when the Air Force One will land, but the spotters on Schiphol are counting on them coming. I think they landed last time. Oh, they have landed. Okay, great. So we're all here, and I think in different words, everybody is still saying we do share these values that NATO is based on. And I hope that the outcome of the summit, if the outcome is, you know, a very short statement saying 5 percent, President Trump claiming victory because of the 5 percent, then we can go on to the next phase, and I think that's what we need to do. So I wouldn't say that we have stopped sharing these values, but I would say it's become increasingly difficult to define exactly these values.

Well, the Middle East has always been, let's say, complicated, and it is complicated again. That's an understatement. Yeah, that's an understatement. I think it's very difficult, but I agree, so multilateralism is also under threat, especially because the United States is also withdrawing from multilateralism, and President Trump seems to feel more at ease in a world where the great powers are, you know, sort of in charge. It's also difficult for me to see the coherence in the policy of the United States, and I think that Netanyahu must be very pleased by things that are happening, and it distracts the world also from Gaza, and I think it's very difficult, you know, also for the Americans to understand their president. He wanted to be a president who did not draw America into wars all over the world, which is exactly what he seems to be doing now with the strikes on Iran with a very uncertain outcome. So it's difficult to see coherence. It's difficult to understand the reasoning behind this, and I really worry about not only multilateralism, but, you know, the rule of law, international rule of law in general. This eventually will lead to a world where, like I said, might makes right. The great powers decide about the fate of all other countries, and that's very difficult, and I think there Europe has to step up, and I think we're not able and not very influential in the situation in Iran now, but I think we have to speak up because if the European Union doesn't do that anymore, if nobody defends the international rule of law anymore, then it's going to disappear without a fight, and that is, I think, one of the fundamental characters of the European Union, is that we want this to be a world where we do abide by the rule of law, and we have to say so, and we have to keep pushing that agenda.

Well, you know, NATO has relied also on its technological edge by having the best capabilities. I think the F-35, for example, are a good example of that. But it's true, warfare is really transforming, and I think there are two things. First of all, drones have become very, very important in the war in Ukraine. Ukraine is relying very heavily on them, but also if you look at casualties, I think 70% now is caused by drones, and only 30% by traditional artillery and things like that. So that's completely changed the warfare, and we have to keep in mind that there are now only two countries who have combat experience in this type of warfare, and that's Ukraine and Russia, nobody else.

Well, that's not reassuring. So that's one thing, and the second is, of course, the technology itself. It means that tanks are completely useless unless they are integrated in new technology. So the combination of tanks with drones, various types, can still be very useful. And the same goes for every other capability that we have. You have to use the new technology, including autonomous systems, in the way that they're being used now on the battlefield in Ukraine. I've seen some examples only last week also. Not only drones that fly, it's also ground vehicles that can transport wounded people or transport spare parts or anything. Of course, the sea drones, we've seen spectacular results by the Ukrainians in the Black Sea. This is completely changing warfare, and that's why I'm glad to see that many European and Americans understand this and are setting up in Ukraine to learn, to contribute with their knowledge, but also to learn from real-time experience on the battlefield because we need to train with this. We need our military also to understand this type of warfare. And it's undergone a huge change in a short period of time. I remember in the beginning, so only 2022, 2023, when we trained the Ukrainian military in the U.K., and we had the trenches, and we had a couple of drones for training purposes, but nothing like what we've seen later on where you are, you know, if you are a military in the trench and you see the drone, you're dead. So you have to take all kinds of precautions that we knew nothing about earlier on. So it has changed, and I think the challenge is to also adapt our industries, and it will be interesting to see if the big primes will keep that type of monopoly, whether they will cooperate with the new tech companies, drone-building companies, whether they will take over them and integrate them in their systems and in their proposals. It's going to be very interesting times.

Well, I would say two things. First of all, yes, it is a big threat, the cyberattacks, but if it were that easy, why didn't Russia just disrupt Ukraine completely with cyberattacks before they rolled in with their troops? Because they couldn't. So you can also protect yourself against cyberattacks. So that is one thing, and I think we have to be very much prepared to do so. And the second thing is about attribution. We're always very careful about attribution, and rightly so, we should be. But at the same time, we hear, especially from the countries in the northern part of Europe, you know, if something walks like a duck and quarks like a duck, it's probably a duck, even if you're not 100% sure because you didn't check the DNA. And I think we have to be like that with these cyberattacks and with this interference as well. Okay, we will continue to try to contribute, but we also know the countries that are doing this because we know out of experience, we know out of previous situations where we have been able to attribute. And sometimes our intelligence services will also say, we know this, we just don't want to go public because we cannot disclose our sources, et cetera. So I think we have to have this general idea of, yes, it could be a non-stately actor, it could be something else, but it is the modus operandi of the Russians. This is what they do, and this is what we have to protect ourselves against.

It's important for people to realize that this is not some kind of science fiction, that this is really happening in daily life, that our critical infrastructure, that our companies are on a daily basis protecting themselves against these cyberattacks, and these cyberattacks come from somewhere, and very often it will be Russia. Just trying, just looking for vulnerabilities, and they'll probably fail 99 out of 100 times, but one in 100, they will succeed.

I think the sanctions are very, very important, and we should absolutely continue to have the toughest possible sanctions on Russia. They are probably more effective than Russia will admit, because even Russia in the past couple of days has admitted to little tension in their economy. So they are more effective than they will care to admit, and they are not as effective as we would want them to be. And it's taken time to build them up, but we must continue. And I think also now with the situation in the Middle East, in the Strait of Hormuz, and the oil prices have probably increased, a cap on the Russian oil price would be very, very helpful. The sanctions bill that's being prepared in the United States Senate by Lindsey Graham could be very, very helpful in putting pressure on Russia. So I'm a very strong believer in increasing the pressure by implying sanctions and making it more difficult for Russia to continue in this war economy. I mean the frustration that you could have is that at some point the war economy is necessary for Russia because it is the motor that drives the country at some point. And Putin doesn't seem to want to stop the war, but also at some point the economy becomes dependent on the warfare.

Well, interesting. I wasn't aware of this suggestion. I think we would be most effective in the field of sanctions if the large economic powers impose them. So that means that the European Union, being a very important player, should impose them. It means that the United States, being an important player, should impose them. So it doesn't necessarily have to be NATO, and it does blur a little bit the responsibilities between institutions. But I think it's an interesting thought because there are all kinds of instruments of warfare, and this could be one of them.

Well, the red line protest in the Netherlands, for those who are not from the Netherlands, we have had two very large-scale demonstrations in the last couple of weeks, were about Gaza. They were about the war in Gaza and they were about the suffering of the civilians in Gaza. And that was the red line. And there were really a lot of people. I think they were the largest demonstration in the Netherlands in decades. I think that's very telling and it shows us that people care and that they're involved and engaged. And I think that's really very hopeful. The protests against NATO were relatively small. And that's fine because, of course, there are people who will disagree and you have to leave space for that. So I think that's also encouraging that we live in a country where that's possible. And so my conclusion would be people do care about the world around them and they do care about human suffering and they do care about countries that are being under attack and innocent people suffering and dying. So I think it's good and you should show that to people, to show that those populists who offer simple solutions cannot deliver. They cannot do what they promise. So in our last elections, which were two years ago, there was a lot of talk about migration and the solution the populists offered was we will close the borders and stop the migration. Well, the government tried it, didn't get anywhere, it didn't work. So people will realize now that this is a false promise, that there are no simple solutions to complex issues and that often the solutions can be done, but in cooperation with other countries. And in this case, the European Union, I think, is the right format to talk about migration and what we want to do with migration and also about illegal migration, which is the real issue, of course. And so I think we have to treat this serious. We have to make people aware that those politicians who promise those simple solutions will probably not be able to deliver. Look at what happened here and the same goes for other countries. But we also have, of course, to show that these concerns are also the concerns that we want the governments to take care of. Sometimes in the Netherlands we're a little bit jealous about countries like Finland or Sweden where resilience seems to be much higher and where engagement in security seems to be much higher. But it's also natural because Finland has this very, very long border with Russia and also has this history of really a war with Russia. Finland against the Soviet Union. Well, that's, you know, the mouse and the elephant. But they didn't get out of it too badly. They came out of it still independent. They lost a lot of territory, but they were independent and able in the end also to join the European Union. So obviously they are more resilient and obviously they are more worried about being actually in a war than we are here in the Netherlands where we know that the Germans are our best friend. And on the other side of the canal we have the UK, so we feel very safe. And that's even more so in the southern part of Europe where they face different things, but they're not so worried about the Russians. And you can tell them that, you know, a ballistic missile could reach you in five minutes. But people don't really feel that. So I think that is also how to get this on the front page every day, how to get this news to people, how to make people care and how to make people realize that they can also contribute themselves. You don't have to become a military to be involved. There are so many ways that you as a citizen can help to make your country a more secure place.

Well, you know, if you try to imagine what Russia would do, what Putin would do, you would try to find the weakest spot. And that's probably one of the Baltic countries. We have to be really realistic about that because of geography they're small and they're difficult to defend. It has improved though with Finland and Sweden joining, of course, but still it's tough. So it's probably not going to attack Poland but one of the Baltic states and see what we do. But then again, we are prepared for this. We know that this is probably the weakest link and we have plans, military plans on the NATO side on how to do this. And all NATO allies are involved in this. And if this happens at one point, it's also out of their hands because SACEUR will be completely in charge and he will be able to trigger everything that results out of this Article 5. Of course, countries could in theory say, well, it's Article 5 situation but we will not allow the employment of our troops. At some point they could do that. So probably not in the first round of defenses because then SACEUR will just act with the capabilities he has at hand at that moment and that's available in the plan. If it drags on, then you will have to refresh and increase and respond. And their countries could, in theory, say no. But then, I mean, they would threaten the whole alliance. And that is what I think that countries are not prepared to do because in the end you're in this alliance also for your own protection. So it has a price and this price is very, very high. And I think so we have to take the assessments of our intelligence services very serious, which is so in three to five years Russia could be able again to do this. At this moment they're not. They're too much engaged in Ukraine. They have withdrawn from many other places. They have to rebuild it on their western flank first. But three to five years they could. And I think our military and the NATO military under command of SACEUR, they have to prepare for this. And we have to know exactly in all scenarios what our response would be.

Well, thank you very much. Of course, that is exactly, I think, the right question also for after the summit. So once we got this out of the way and the 5% in the final declaration, then the countries will have to start implementing this. And as I said, so it's not really 5%, it's 3.5. And in the 1.5 you could put anything you like. And I think countries will put cyber defense in it. They will put infrastructure in it, military mobility, enabling whatever comes ashore in the Netherlands to be transported through Germany and Poland to the eastern flank. So these things, I think, will be covered by very sensible investments. So in the 3.5, which is really the hard defense side, we know more or less what we have to do because we have the NATO capability targets. But I agree very much with you. They are vital. So if we continue to do what we did, we will get what we got. So that's not smart to do. We have to do more jointly. We really have to get our act together and to start thinking about why have we never been able to tackle this fragmentation within NATO. We've known it for decades that we're completely fragmented. And that is because we all have our national interests and that our parliaments are not so much worried about defense. They're worried about our national defense industry. And we really have to stop that. So if we want to become stronger, we have to get more value for our money, which means that we have to invest in joint capabilities. And there are all these examples of how the United States has much less types of vessels, types of tanks, types of armored vehicles, which makes them stronger. And that's what we have to do. And I think this war in Ukraine has helped. We have seen now that if you really want to scale up and you want to have much faster results, that you have to stop all this gold plating. And you have to agree in a group of countries that this is okay. This is a good armored vehicle. It's been tested by one country. Let's just use it in 10 countries. And let's accept that if this one ally says that this is perfect for their armed forces, it's also good for the others. And I think this is what we will see. So that's one thing, no more fragmentation, much more interoperability and interchangeability. And the second is exactly as you're saying, so not only in steel. It has to be in people, in experts, in people who know, in engineers who know their tech stuff, and also in these new technologies. And they are very different because we are used also in our ministries, in our procurement offices, to have very lengthy procedures to, after a couple of years or a couple, three, five years, have a result in a contract for very expensive capabilities. And after 10 years, you will get it. That doesn't work in this world anymore. You need to have scalable products. You need to have agile procedures. You have to be able to experiment. And you have to have cooperation between the Ministry of Defense and these enterprises. And you have to take some risks in the beginning. You have to adapt the capabilities as you go along the way. You have to see what works in real time and then to adapt again and to upgrade it. So this is a completely different mindset that you need also in the ministries and also from your contractors. And that's, I would say, almost a cultural change. And as we all know, these are the most difficult to achieve. But it's absolutely necessary. We don't have much time.

Well, yes, I have worked with him for a long time and in various positions. I've worked with him as a civil servant, as his secretary general at the time at the prime minister's office. I've also worked with him as a colleague in two governments led by him. And I must say I really think he is the right man for the job. He has to keep all those allies together. He has to make sure that the United States stays engaged. He has to make sure that countries that struggle with their budgets will sign tomorrow for the 5 percent. And that is what he does best, and that is to engage with countries, with people, with prime ministers and presidents. He knows how important the relationships can be. He builds relationships. He knows what he's talking about. I think that's very important. He does exaggerate when he praises Donald Trump. He does exaggerate a little bit, in my opinion, but it serves a purpose. So I think we're glad to have him as NATO's sec gen in these turbulent times.