Ukraine, Diplomacy, and the Road Ahead: A Talk with Ambassador Alle Dorhout

Hi.

Here, sit there.

Well, good morning, everybody. Thank you very much for coming. Well, first of all, shaping history is a very difficult thing, but at least I've got the feeling that I'm in the middle of history. And of course, it makes a huge difference studying history from books in the library of your university or being part of it. So I feel a very privileged person that I can serve my country in that place on this moment, partly as an observer of history, but also taking part in what's happening. But shaping history would be a little bit too ambitious, I'm afraid.

Yes, it's a challenge for everybody. And it's also very much living in two parallel realities, because when there is no air attack, then Kiev is a very nice, beautiful East European city. And the shops are open, the restaurants are open, and people do just their thing like they do in Amsterdam. But when there is an air attack, and there is an air alert, and the air defense starts walking, then it's a totally different environment. And of course, people have to look for shelter. The house where I live in has a basement, which is a shelter. That's where I sleep. My bed is in my shelter, in my bunker. And a couple of weeks ago, I was just working in the embassy. And I was looking outside because I heard a lot of shooting. And there was an Iranian Shahed drone flying by the embassy at a distance of 100 meters. And that's, well, it's a very real, surrealistic experience.

Well, I think it's very difficult to get a grip on that complex parallel realities that exist in Ukraine. And when I talk to my kids, and I shouldn't say hi to them, I notice that the news you get from Ukraine is only the bad news. And through NOS.nl and New.nl, it's only bad news that comes from Ukraine. So it's easy to get a one-sided idea of what's happening in Ukraine. And of course, that's part of the reality as well. But there's also a different reality, which is a country that is very bravely fighting for its existence, but also enjoying life, because they don't want the Russians to dictate on what they should do or not.

I have been at the front line, but I have been in Kharkiv, in Zaporizhzhia, in Dnipro. So these are the cities that are far more attacked than other places in Ukraine, and they have not as good air defense as we have in Kyiv.

Well, in September, Prime Minister Shov was in Ukraine, and we took him to Dnipro to meet President Zelensky. And this was a very good meeting, and President Zelensky very much valued the fact that Prime Minister Shov – ex-Prime Minister Shov, I should say – had the courage to come to a place that was rather close to the front line. So that was very much appreciated. But on the way back, we had to turn around suddenly and dive into a bunker to look for shelter because there was a drone, a reconnaissance drone, above the train that would take us back. And normally, a reconnaissance drone means that a ballistic missile is on its way or will be on its way shortly. So the Ukrainian security guards were very worried about the situation. And for Prime Minister Shov, it was the first time that he had to drive with 150 kilometers an hour to a safe place and was pushed into a bunker. So it really added to his experience. Quite a memory.

Well, you know, diplomacy is very much based on information, and intelligence is just another piece of information. And a lot of what people would describe as intelligence is also available through open sources. So collectives like Follow the Money, Bellingcat, they have very, very good software to look into open sources and make connections and find information that you can use. So also for intelligence agencies, open source intelligence is also a very, very interesting part of the whole specter that you look into. And then, of course, there is also intelligence from less open sources. And that's very interesting for a Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And there is a very structured interaction between the intelligence services and the ministries that make policy and have to execute policy, and they can take that into account.

Well, we work with different conceptions of war nowadays, and war used to be a very clear thing in black and white. I mean, when you have war, you have one party, another party, and they fight with each other. And this is what they call a hybrid war. So there is no war declared as an obligation under military law or a war law. That kind of declaration is not there. But nevertheless, there are very unfriendly acts that we see every day. If you read the annual report of the intelligence service of the Netherlands, you can read that several countries make cyber attacks on the Netherlands, and some of these countries do it daily. And it can be on the financial infrastructure, it can be on hospitals, it can be on transport infrastructure, like the port of Rotterdam or Schiphol. And being an open society, we are vulnerable to that kind of attacks. And they come from several countries, but Russia is most certainly one of the most important countries that we have to look at, if you think about cyber attacks.

Well, the key narrative that Russia is pushing today, and not just today, for the last, I would say, 20 years, is the restoration of the Soviet Union as a colonial empire. So it's really, it's a colonial narrative. The interesting thing is when people talk about colonialism, we tend to look at Great Britain, at France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and these were all overseas empires. And even this kind of colonialism has not yet been finished. I mean, there's still a huge debate about decolonization in different parts of society that still need to be done. But another type of colonialism is land colonialism. And the big empires that we see today, like China and Russia, could be described as colonial empires. And the narrative of President Putin is very much this colonial narrative, in which he wants to keep this empire together. And if he cannot fully control a country or occupy a country, which is impossible for Ukraine because people will never accept it, then the second best thing is to occupy part of it and try for a pro-Russian government over time. That would be the best outcome for Putin. And I think that is one of the most important parts of his narrative.

Yeah, still has. Because colonial empires cannot be held together in a democracy. You need a totalitarian state to keep it together, because it's too diverse and too big. And that's exactly what we see in Russia.

Yeah, that's a good question, because it's more or less undutch to make such a strong choice in supporting Ukraine. And I think the explanation is threefold probably. First of all, when you look at Dutch history, you can see that we as the Netherlands, as a small country, we have been occupied by big European forces three times in history at least. First the Spanish, and then we fought a war for freedom. Then we had the French, and then of course we had the Germans in the Second World War. And so we know what it is to live next to a big neighbor. We know what it is to be occupied, and we know what it is to fight for freedom. So that is one thing I would say. The other thing is that the Netherlands has, from the 17th century on, be the country where international law has been developed from Hugo de Groot. He wrote about the law of the sea, but that was a moment where the Netherlands has always been a driving force behind international law. And that was because the Netherlands never had the military means to protect its trade interests. So for the Netherlands, it was important to work with agreements with other big powers like Great Britain at the time, because we didn't have the military means to protect our interests. So nowadays, the Netherlands has the Hague, the peace capital and law capital of the world, with a lot of international organizations that are in one way or the other connected to international law. So international law is important. And what happened here, the full-scale invasion of Russia, was of course a brute violation of international law. And if you believe in international law, if you believe in an international system and multilateralism, then you have to stand up for that. And of course, sovereignty is one of the key principles of international law, and that has been violated in a very brute way. The third thing, I believe, is MH17. On the 17th of July in 2014, flight MH17 of Malaysia Airwaves was shot out of the air by a Russian rocket. And this has really shaken the Netherlands, and a lot of people know somebody who knows somebody, but everybody feels connected to what happened there, which was such a blunt crime and such a sad thing that happened.

Well, I think for a lot of people, it made it a very logical thing to support Ukraine against Russian aggression, because this was also Russian aggression that took down a plane. And it all came together in the person of Mark Rutte. I think Mark Rutte, of course, he stands for freedom as a liberal politician. He is also schooled in history and international law, and he was very, very, very much connected to what happened at MH17 and the follow-up, which has also very much to do with accountability. So these three factors and the person of Mark Rutte made that the Netherlands stood firm behind Ukraine since the beginning of the war. And indeed, we have committed like 17 billion euros in support, 10 billion military support, and 7 million non-military support. And in all possible ways, we stand by Ukraine.

Well, as a matter of fact, there is broad support for Ukraine in the Dutch parliament. It has been the case, it still is the case. So from my point of view, my perspective, support for Ukraine was still taking place in the same way as it was under the Mark Rutte government. And of course, also this government secured 3.5 billion euros for support to Ukraine earlier this year. From my perspective, it didn't make a huge change, although of course, we all know that within the coalition that just fell apart, that a party like PVV was not very much in support of Ukraine. And it's always nice if you have a coalition with solid 100% support for Ukraine. So this government sometimes had to rely on other parties in parliament to get the full support for Ukraine that was necessary, but they always succeeded.

Well, I think for the Ukrainian counterparts, it's very clear that the Netherlands was, is and will be a strong supporter. And in Ukraine, the government is, of course, also very much aware of what's happening in the Netherlands and what kind of changes there were in the coalition, in the Dutch government. So sometimes people ask me for an explanation, but most of all, people don't doubt the Dutch support whatsoever.

Well, Ukraine has already taken a lot of important steps. And EU accession is, well, it's not really a negotiation with Brussels because Brussels just tells you what to do. And one of the most important things that aspiring countries or member states need to do is to take over the EU rules and regulations, the legislation and what we call the acquis. And the acquis is the total of European rules and regulations. And so far, Ukraine has done very well in preparing the takeover of European rules and regulations. And it is a beautiful example of cooperation between the Ukrainian parliament, the government, civil society, and they work closely together to make sure that this process of taking over legislation goes as good as possible under the given circumstances. And of course, now Ukraine has a couple of very difficult challenges. First of all, the war. They need to finish the war in the best way they can. The other big challenge is, of course, internally. And it has to do with fighting corruption, but it also has to do with reforming the judiciary. And the third challenge is EU accession. And the war is, of course, a short-term challenge. EU accession is not a short-term, but more like a medium-term challenge. But the spirit is good. The spirit is high. President Zelensky is very much in favor of EU accession. Of course, there's a lot of contact between the EU leadership and the Ukrainian leadership. And so far, we are on the right track. In the European Union, we have a problem that every decision on steps in the EU accession process of Ukraine need to be taken by unanimity. And there we run into trouble with Hungary, because Hungary doesn't want to agree. And Hungary is able to hold up the process, which is very uncomfortable for the other member states and for the European Commission. Nevertheless, we go on preparing the process as far as we can, and there's still a lot of work to do. But we hope that we can open the first cluster of chapters. So the AKI, the EU rules and regulations, is built up in 35 chapters, and the chapters are built up in several clusters. And the first cluster that's going to be opened also contains the chapters on rule of law, human rights, judiciary, et cetera. And that's a very important cluster. It's always the first that is being opened and the last to be closed. But I hope we can open this cluster soon. And as soon as Ukraine also fulfills the criteria for opening other clusters, I hope we can do that under the Polish presidency.

Well, corruption still is, as you say, still is a thing, a problem in Ukraine. I mean, the Ukrainian population, if you look at opinion polls, the Ukrainian population thinks that corruption is still, after the war, the biggest problem they have to face. Another problem is trust in public institutions, including the judiciary. But when you look at the trend, I think the trend is up. This is not to say that there is still not a lot of work to do, but the trend is up. And the important thing is to keep the trend up and make important steps in this field.

Well, that's a very difficult question. But the Netherlands is, of course, involved in this coalition of the willing talks. And the coalition of the willing now consists of quite a number of European countries. And a decision to, or a decision about boots on the ground, Dutch boots on the ground in Ukraine is not a decision that can be taken by the current government, that is de missionaire, as you know. So I don't expect any decision on that. And it is, of course, a very difficult decision because you have to take it together and move on. But it's hard to predict how this will develop. But the fact that Europe is working very hard on developing plans and also deploying troops in Lithuania and the Baltic states, who feel and are, as a matter of fact, much closer to the conflict in Ukraine and to Russia, that's a very good sign. I think also the decision of March to spend 800 billion euros on defence and defence industry also is a clear sign that Europe is taking a new course in its own history.

Thank you very much. Well, from my diplomatic experience, if you want a diplomatic solution, you need two to tango. And at the moment, there's only one party that's willing to talk and willing to compromise on certain things. And what we see coming from Russia, the narrative, the Russian narrative, didn't change at all. And when one of the two parties is not prepared to change its goals, it's very hard to see how you can get to a sustainable diplomatic solution. So I'm not too positive about it.

Well, thank you very much for the question. I always hope that people forgot about this referendum, but apparently not everybody did. I think it's important to realize that this referendum in 2016, that was about the EU association with Ukraine. In the Netherlands, it was a referendum that was about anything but Ukraine. It was about housing. It was about transport. It was about many national political issues. It was against the government, but it was not as much against Ukraine. And so sometimes when I have this question in Ukraine as well, I can always answer, this was a moment in Dutch history where we also decided that the referendum is maybe not the best way to get the right answer to a certain question. And we haven't seen a referendum since. But this was a moment in history that, of course, from the Ukrainian perspective, was looked at with some anxiety, which I fully understand. But I would say it was just a hiccup, nothing more. And since 2022, we have really shown where the Netherlands stands for. And both in the Dutch parliament and under the Dutch population, there is still huge support for what we do in Ukraine as the Netherlands.

Well, I think it's important to realize that the main reason for the Netherlands and a lot of European countries to invite Ukraine to become a member of the European Union once it fulfills the criteria is that Ukraine is fighting for common values. And let's be honest, Ukraine is fighting for the security of Europe. And Ukraine has, over the last 20, 30 years, been very clear during all revolutions, during everything that happened at Maidan, which you know of course. And I think the Ukrainians made it very clear that they stand, they want to stand for democracy and they seek a future in the context of these European values that we are so much attached to. So to become a member of this value-based community that the European Union is, I think that's the main reason to support the path of accession of Ukraine to the European Union. And indeed, I should say, Ukraine also has something to offer to the European Union. It has a rapidly growing defense industry, which we need. It has a huge army, which also helps in securing our position in the future world. It has a huge potential in agriculture. So there are many fields where the EU and Ukraine are compatible or can reinforce each other. And of course, there are also some things we need to look at internally from the European perspective, because Ukraine is a big country. And it means that we have to rethink the agricultural policy of the European Union. This will lead to protests in France and Poland, I can already predict. But it also needs rethinking the institutional structure, because when a big country accedes to the European Union, it also has an impact on these institutions.

Well, I would be quite pessimistic about it. And we also need to look into the mirror, because the Russian narrative has never been a secret narrative. President Putin has always been very clear on what he wants, and what he sees as the future of Russia and relation with Ukraine. And I think sometimes we in Europe didn't want to see or to hear what was being said. But some kind of wishful thinking led us to Minsk and other agreements, of which we could know beforehand that it was not in line with the Russian narrative. And there was no sign whatsoever that Russia was going to change that narrative. So I think the lesson learned is that we should not do that again. And that we should be very, we should look very clearly and listen very carefully. And indeed, Russia has shown that it's not a trustworthy partner. But again, it's clear on what its goals are. And it has a lot of instruments still to achieve that goal. And that should we keep in mind when starting to talk to Russians.

Yeah.

Well, this regain control over Ukraine and destroy the Ukrainian identity. And that has been a very clear and open narrative that has always been expressed by President Putin himself, but also by all the spokespeople of the Kremlin.

Accountability about Russian war crimes?

Well, yeah, the Netherlands is also a very strong supporter, also because of all the legal institutions that we have in the Netherlands, but also because of our own constitution and things we believe in. We are a strong supporter of accountability. And so accountability needs to be part of any kind of peace agreement. What at the end of the day it will come to, that's hard to predict. But we have the same meeting in Lviv you referred to. We also had a meeting on the aggression tribunal that was supported by the European Union. And this is under the umbrella of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. This is a tribunal that's explicitly designed for acting upon war crimes and getting towards accountability. And it's, of course, very hard. And we know that as the Netherlands, from the processes related to MH17, to get the culprits behind the bars in the Netherlands or any other country. But at least you have to do this research, you have to carry out these trials, you have to convict culprits, because that also gives satisfaction to the people that are hit very hard by the Russian aggression.

Well, under the peace formula of President Zelensky, there are a couple of working groups. And one of the working groups, Working Group 4, is dealing with humanitarian issues. And they work more behind the screens. So, I mean, that's not something that is in the newspaper every day. But they also are working on the abducted children. So there's like 20,000 abducted children from Ukraine, somewhere in Russia. Some orphans, some taken from families. That's one issue. But the other issue is, of course, also the exchange of prisoners of war. Quite recently, we saw an exchange of thousands of prisoners of war between Russia and Ukraine. And of course, this is something that makes people, families of the prisoners in Ukraine very happy. And these kinds of negotiations are also being supported diplomatically by the international community.

Well, that's a very difficult question. Because before President Trump started his administration on the 20th of January in the United States, the Biden administration was much more in favor of Ukraine becoming a member of NATO. And even last year, there was a NATO summit almost one year ago. And this summit, it was concluded that the path of Ukraine to NATO was irreversible. Well, that's quite plain language. Nevertheless, also in NATO, like in the European Union, you need unanimity. You need all the members or allies to agree upon this. And it's not just the United States. It's also, again, Hungary that has reservations for its own political reasons. But as long as there's no unanimity, it's very difficult to see how Ukraine can join NATO. Then, of course, the next question is, what is second best? Second best is what the Italian president proposed, that NATO will still guarantee Ukraine, perhaps not as a member or a NATO ally, but still extending Article 5 of NATO to Ukraine, to the Ukrainian territory, now under Ukrainian control. But this has also led to very complicated discussions about what this will mean for NATO, et cetera. So there was no unanimity for that as well. And now we are working on the coalition of the willing and hope that this will at least provide the highest level of security that Europe can offer to Ukraine.

I don't see that that will be part of the solution. And keeping a nuclear, I mean, apart from the question whether that would be wise to do, it also costs a lot of money to keep a nuclear arsenal.

Well, until a certain extent, and we were just talking about security guarantees. Yes, we do have two nuclear powers in Europe, the UK and France, but they are not a match for Russia. So during the Cold War, we had this concept of balance and mutually reassured disruption, which meant that neither of the two blocs would use nuclear arms because they both knew that if the one would start, the other would retaliate and there would be no winners at the end. When there's a disbalance, as there is now, this concept doesn't work as it should work. And without the American support, Europe will not be able, I guess, to get up the escalation ladder, as we say, until the end. So Europe still needs the U.S. to be able to escalate until the highest levels. And if you can't do that, you have an imbalance. And that imbalance creates also complexity in keeping up security in Europe.

Yes, well, these are political trends that are, of course, worrying for several reasons. And the interference of Elon Musk, for instance, in the German elections was also very, very worrying. And political trends in countries like France and Germany with AfD, yes, they lead to concern. They lead to concern. And I think you rightly put out that among these far-right politicians, support for Ukraine is not a given. And we have to take that into account when we think about other scenarios. But now, if you look at the current German government, the new German government, the new Bundeskanzler is much more in favor of supporting Ukraine than his predecessors. So I wouldn't too easily say that things go the wrong direction, but it is something to be very alert on, indeed.

Well, that's not impossible, but it will take time. And as long as it takes time, we will one way or the other depend on the United States, because we do not have the same capabilities for intelligence. We do not have the same capabilities for the highest field of escalation in war. And we do not have the technological capabilities like Starlink. So both Ukraine and Europe will for some time still be dependent. And if we want to be independent, we will have to invest a lot of money in our own independence. Another nice example is GPS. We all use GPS, Google Maps, and GPS is an integral part of our daily technological routine. Of course, the European Union has its own system. It's called Galileo. And it is a parallel system, but it's not yet as big as GPS and not as widely used. So Europe is capable of developing its own capabilities, but it needs time and it needs a lot of money.

That, of course, relates very much to the question how you want to finance it and whether you want to add to your budget deficit. If you're willing to do so, like the American administration does, then it will be easier politically. But it's the question whether that is a very wise decision financially. And otherwise, you have to make very painful decisions within your own budget, which means that education will be affected, transport will be affected, housing will be affected, healthcare will be affected. So it demands a whole different set of political choices that will affect the whole of society.

Well, first of all, Ukraine, until quite recently, was hardly represented in Africa. Well, Africa was quite dependent on Ukrainian grain for obvious reasons. And what we see now is that Ukraine has a lot of new diplomatic initiatives in Africa, in Africa, it's opening embassies in Africa, and it's also working on grain diplomacy, which more or less means that Ukraine makes clear to a lot of African countries that there are a lot of good things coming from Ukraine, that African countries are profiting from what's coming from Ukraine, and that in return, Ukraine would very much appreciate also some political support. But so far, it is not yet a system that works very well because of two reasons. First of all, Russia is also very present in Africa and has a very different agenda and doesn't play by the rules. And what we've seen in the Sahel is, of course, that they support governments that do not relate to Europe regarding values and principles. But also, it coincides with the next chapter of discussion about decolonization. And in the Sahel, it's very obvious because this is about relation with France. And they will be taken to a new stage in this long story of decolonization. So the West in general, but in particular, the former colonial powers, are not in a very good position to re-engage with some African governments and get support for Ukraine as well. And so Ukraine is also very much, of course, associated with the West because of all the support of the West for Ukraine.

Well, that's difficult because governments and political leaders in Africa have also good reason not to trust the former colonial power that much. And so this is a complicated relationship. And at this moment in time, it's very difficult to engage and re-engage. And we should not forget that apart from values and humanitarian aid, that development assistance or development cooperation has become less and less relevant in the financial perspectives of these countries. So remittances are more important. Foreign direct investment is more important. And where maybe 20, 30 years ago, development cooperation, development assistance, was from a financial perspective, also something you could use as leverage to get to this question about values, human rights, rule of law, etc. This is not anymore the case, and also not anymore the wish of a lot of these governments that want to determine their own course. Also, what we see in Africa, of course, is a lot of weak governments in Mali, in Burkina Faso, in Niger. And these are governments that are difficult to work with because they are so sensitive to the Russian narrative and the money and military support that comes with it.

Well, it could contribute to the complexity of relations we have now. But what you see in general, and I think in global affairs, is that relations and policies are more and more interest-based and less value-based. And I think Europe is the last part of the world where we still have a human rights policy, we have a value-based foreign policy. And President Trump has been very, very clear on this. I mean, where the United States was also a very big supporter of value-based programs, they are not anymore. The USAID, for instance, was in Ukraine one of the biggest, biggest donors in the field of independent media, human rights, civil society organizations, accountability. But this has been withdrawn within 48 hours, more or less. So if you look at trends in international politics, I would say the trend is far more towards interest-based and less towards value-based. And if the European Union wants to engage with partners in Africa, we always try not to lose sight of the value-based part, which is also enshrined in the Treaty of the European Union and our constitution. So we do have an obligation there. But I think the balance between interest-based and value-based is shifting a little bit. This is like a fluid hierarchy of principles where you see that if security policy concerns and economic interest is at stake, it will go on behalf of the space of value-based policies and principles.

Yes, I know what you refer to. And of course, there's a mobilization in Ukraine. Ukraine is a country at war. And they need soldiers to defend the country. And Ukraine has its own laws to deal with that. And the law on mobilization, which means that people between 25 years and, I believe, 61 or 60, well, at least at that age, is under certain conditions obliged to serve in the military. And this is Ukrainian law. And of course, I'm very sad for young people to be forced by this law to go to the front and fight. But this is internal law. And I don't see how it interferes with human rights as such. And I don't know, to be honest, whether in Ukraine you have a possibility to say no to mobilization. I don't think there is. But in the Netherlands, we had conscription until the 90s of last century. And people who didn't want to serve in the army could do alternative service and so have an alternative. But I don't think that's the case in Ukraine now.

Yes, so on a personal level, I do, of course, very much understand that young people do not want to necessarily, all of them want to go to the front to fight with the risk of dying. I find that totally understandable. But when you look at it from a different perspective, not on a personal level, but more abstract and legal level, and the fact that it's a country at war, it's just a very difficult situation.

Well, I think I can join in saying what a lot of military and political leaders have said, that is, get real. Look at what you see and listen to what you hear and what's coming from Russia. And that's not very consorting. So the threat is real. And maybe people in the Netherlands don't feel it yet as much. But people in the Baltic States and people in Finland, they are feeling this for real. And people in Poland as well. And even people in Sweden and Norway and Denmark are talking about building shelters, et cetera, et cetera. So in the Netherlands, we are a bit further away from the war. And in Spain and Portugal, it's really if you talk to people there, they say, well, we've got a lot of fish to fry. We have other concerns, migration from North Africa, youth unemployment, et cetera, et cetera. But also they face threats from Russia and cyber domain. And the threat is real. We have to respond. We have to prepare. And when we say peace through strength for Ukraine, I also believe for peace through strength for the whole of Europe. Because if we are prepared and we are going to be prepared, that's why we took this decision on the 800 billion euro for defence and defence industry. That's the best way to prevent conflict, to be strong.

Well, I would say the threat is real. Don't be afraid. We can do that. But it will ask from everybody involved, the whole of society, it will ask a couple of difficult choices, but we need to make them. Otherwise, we will regret it for the years to come.

Thanks for coming.